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SOCIAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
CONVERGING DISCOURSES?
Henry. Steiner
It hardly surprises that argument for the creation and implementation of
human rights treate rests primarily on notions of rights and social justice. Rights-
based and fairness-based arguments also dominates the work of the myriad
international institutions created overthe human rights movement's half century
in orderto expound, promote, monitor, apply and enforce the treaty rules. On
the other hand, the idiom of the international institutions concerned with
economic and social development has been primarily consequentialist, means-
end instrumentalist, welare-maximizing, utilitarian-even with respect to matters
that have much in common with some human rights.
Neither structure of argument is easily defined or cabined within
boundaries that clearly separate the two. Interpretation of rights, for example,
proceeds through argument and decisions that go well beyond any mere
"application" to given facts of treaty texts or the terse postulates of rights or
theories of fairness or justice that underlie them. The process is far more
complex. Despite such internal complexities, these two modes of argument are
at their core very different discourses, not only in their antecedents, styles,
structure and language, but often in their purposes and functions as well. Human
rights advocates, scholars and institutions make at best occasional forays into the
other domain.
It is unfortunate that this should be the case. Rights-based and
consequentialist arguments about matters related to human rights can often be
usefully understood not as antagonistic or incompatible but as deeply
interrelated, as implicated in each other, and indeed as profitably employed by
both rights advocates and by economists concerned with growth to achieve
common goals. The two together may have a powerful synergy. In certain
fields, their radical separation may deny both rights advocates and development
economists a more cogent and persuasive exposition of their views and a better
chance to persuade others to their proposals.
My comment means to illustrate why this may be the case in many
* Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law and Director of Human Rights Program,
Harvard Law School. This comment grows out of my talk on the same topic at the
SeminMrio International de Direitos Humanos, held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on November
27-28, 1996. I have profited from discussions about ideas in this comment with Dani
Rodrik and Lewis Sargentich.
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instances by concentrating on one such instance. I draw on a topic common to
rights advocates and development economists: the so-called social rights like
education, health care, and housing that form an important part of the human
rights corpus, and concerns about these same matters that figure in current
thinking about economic, social and human development Rights advocates and
international financial institutions concerned with education, health care, or
poverty should realize that each can, to some degree, draw on and profit from
types of arguments and information typically associated with the other.
I illustrate my ideas through observations about the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (the Covenant), an analysis
of a recent decision ofthe South African Constitutional Court on social rights, and
a description of the changing approach to similar matters (for example, health and
education) in the proposals and policies of two international institutions: the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a specialized agency of the
UN, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank).
Some changes of the last two decades in both the understanding of
social rights by rights advocates and the strategies toward development of
international institutions reveal a fresh perception of how the work and methods
of each may contribute fruitfully to the other. Although the points of departure,
the impulses, and commitments remain profoundly different, argument about
social rights growing out ofthe human rights movement and argument about the
paths toward and nature of development that are now expressed by the UNDP
and the World Bank have more in common.
I. SOCIAL RiGHTS
A The Covenant
The Covenant, which entered into force in 1976 and to which over 140
states are now parties, sets forth the many economic and social rights that its
states parties recognize. The debates of the period when the Covenant was
I GA Res. 2200A (XX), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.16, at 49, UN Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter the
Covenant].
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drafted,2 and much (though not all) of the work of the body implementing this
Covenant (the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), stay within
this discourse of rights.3 Influential principles on the implementation of the
Covenant that were developed by a group of experts hold closely to the text and
to notions of rights.4 Correspondingly, the rhetoric of rights has been alien to
most discussions in the World Bank publications about the nature of
development and the policies to achieve it. There the idiom remains dominantly
consequentialist and utilitarian.
The rights-oriented character of the Covenant is evident throughout.
The preamble declares that economic and social rights are based on the inherent
dignity of all human beings, and respond to the ideal that all human beings may
be free "from fear and want" To the maximum of their available resources, the
states parties commit themselves to take steps to achieve such rights
progressively5
No clear divisions can be made among the different rights declared in
the Covenant Most rights evidence both economic and social concerns. In
some, the economic and workplace character is dominant-for example, rights
to work and to favorable conditions of work such as wages necessary for a
"decent living," or rights to form and advocate through trade unions (Articles 6-
8).6 Articles I 1- 14 of the Covenant have a different character. They range from
rights to "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health," to rights
to education and "an adequate standard of living." Article I I defines such a
standard of lMng to include "adequate food, clothing and housing."
2 Seea-malPhipAston&Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope ofStates Pares'
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Soc/al and Cultural Nghts,
9 Hum. RTs. Q. 156 (1987).
' See, e.g., -eneral Comment No. 4, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, Annex III (1991).
4 The Limburg Prindples on the Implementation of the Intemational Covenant on
Economn, Sbc: and CuAWfta/Jh lTHE REVIEW: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURSTs, No. 37, at43 (1986).
s SeeThe Covenant, supra note I, art. 2.
6 Indeed, several rights that play a central role in the Covenant, such as the right to
association that underlies trade unionism, figure as well in the companion International
Covenant on Cvil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A QC0), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (enteredinto force
Mar. 23, 1976). Al such rights have igured importantly in the work of other international
institutions, particularly the International Labour Organization whose conventions and
processes focus on workers' rights and workplace standards.
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For purposes of clarity in this comment, I shall call these rights in Articles
I 1-14 "social rights," even though they have important economic
consequences. They differ markedly among themselves. Some, such as those
in Article I I on adequate housing and food, are often referred to as social
welfare rights. They address and primarily affect those parts of a population on
the bottom rungs of the socio-economic ladder. By concentrating on the least
well of, the most deprived population, they speak more directly than other parts
ofthe Covenantto its purpose of reducing poverty. On the other hand, other
social rights like those to health care, education and social security, address needs
not only of the economically marginal population but of all citizens.
I shall focus on these social rights. As set forth in the Covenant, they
keep a certain distance from each other. Beyond a general reference to the
interdependence of all rights-civil and political as well as economic and social--
the social rights are related neither to each other nor to the economic rights.
The Covenant reveals no scheme or strategy about economic development or
about a socio-economic transformation that might, say, overcome structural
problems leadingto poverty and marginalization, thereby reducing dependence
on a social safety net Its static character, the absence of any suggestions about
howto get from here (where countries now are) to there (where they ought to
be movingto meettheir obligations underthe Covenant), probably stems partly
from the sharp ideological divisions during the 1950-1966 period when the
Covenant was being drafted.
The strategies for realizing rights, as well as the economic and political
systems within which they were to be realized, remained for the parties to
decide on. The existing liberal and social democracies could readily find in the
Covenant a confirmation of existing arrangements in which tax-and-redistribution
social welfare programs sought to bring the least well off population up to the
level required by the social rights to, say, food or housing.
Nonetheless, in contrast with Articles 22-26 of the constitution-like
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant goes well beyond the bare
articulation of these rights. In several ways, it darifies the mandate of states for
progressive achievement of rights by spelling out a mini program, some elements
of a time schedule. For example, Articles 13(2) and (14) provide for the
sequential realization of free education in sequences that establish priorities such
as free and compulsory primary education.
Such explicit direction is, however, rare in the body of the Covenant.
The treaty text germane to the other social rights indicates either the
components of the right (provisions in Article 12 to the effect that full realization
of the right to health includes matters like prevention of epidemic diseases,
Vol. 4
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provisions for reduction of infant mortality, and assurance to all of medical service
for sickness), or possible strategies toward its realization (provisions in Article I I
to the effect that the right to food requires states to improve methods of
production, conservation and distribution by taking measures like reform of
agrarian systems to achieve efficient resource use).
In these senses, the Covenant (approved by the General Assembly and
submitted to states for ratification in 1966) reflects the approach of an earlier
period ofthe human rights movement Approved more than a decade later, the
Convention on the Eimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women7
(CEDAW) follows a different course. Above all, the treaty text indicates how to
get from here to there. It spells out the routes to reach goals that indude
achieving a number of economic and social rights. Those routes range from the
state's dutyto modify ortransform existing cultural patterns and underlying beliefs
(a duty to promote that is absent from the Covenant) to detailed prescription in
fields like education, employment, rural life, and family life. Economic, social, civil
and political rights are integrated within a program of profound cultural and
political change that includes the active and meaningful participation by women
at all stages. Other basic human rights documents, such as the Declaration on
the Right to Development9 go well beyond the Covenant in their dynamism.
They sketch a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process for
change and emphasize vital elements of the process such as "population
participation in all spheres."9
From the hindsight of later instruments like CEDAW and the Declaration
on the Rightto Development, it becomes possible to understand the Covenant
in similar ways by drawing links among its apparently distinct provisions. To start
with, the economic and workplace rights may lead to government employment
and development policies that stimulate the economy, provide more jobs and
income, and hence reduce dependence on social welfare payments. Achieving
certain rights facilitates the satisFaction of others. Similar relationships exist among
the social rights. Adequate food and housing reduce the need for health care,
adequate health care enables people to undertake work and education,
education in turn improves health and spurs the economy.
The web of relationships and hence the potential causal links are
7 GA Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
8 GA Res.41/128,Annex, U.N. GAOR,41stSess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc.
A/41/53 (1986).
9 Id. art. 8(2).
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pervasive. By definition, these rights, all rights, are inherent goods, but they also
constitute instrumental goods. This dual character informs many parts of the
human rights framework, including of course the classical civil and political rights.
The rightto free speech is understood both as an inherent good, an inalienable
and imperative right, and as a means of enriching the marketplace of ideas and
hence cultural and political processes.
Asirlar blend of rights-based and instrumental argument characterizes
the translation of the social rights into institutional forms and programs. Unlike,
say, the rightto be free from torture, many social rights become meaningful only
when instituted. Inevitably considerations of the costs and benefits associated
with one or another realization of the right, of cost efficiency within a structure
of market prices, become relevant. No single way of satisfying the right to
housing or education is required by the Covenant. Priorities and sequences
must be established. Depending on the path and structure chosen-taxes and
subsidies, criteria for eligibility, co-payments, the mix of market regulation and
public provision, location, and so on-there will be different gainers and losers
and perhaps distinct long-run consequences in comparison with a different
substantive and institutional design of the right
The components of whatever policy is followed arise out of diverse
considerations rather than from an exclusive effort to determine the essential
nature or necessary implications ofthe right. Cultural and political constraints and
traditions will influence the formulation of the policy, as will arguments about
fairness and social justice, and about cost efficiency that will suggest how the
greatest benefit can be derived from a given amount of funds. Such types of
considerations will influence all the fora in which rights-related policies are being
developed or criticized: organs of national governments, treaty bodies such as
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Nghts, and specialized agencies
of the UN such as the World Health Organization.
B. The Soobramoney Case
A 1997 decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa well
illustrates this intertwining of rights-based and cost-benefit or consequentialist
argument in the development of social rights.'0 Articles 26 and 27 of the 1996
Constitution declare rights to housing, health care, food, and social security.
Clause (I) of Article 27 states that "Everyone has the right to have access to
,0 Soobramoney v. Minister of Heafth Q(awzulu-Natao), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
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health care services...." Clause (2), to the same effect as clause (2) of Article 26,
provides that the state "must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of this right
In their references to available resources and to progressive realisation, these
clauses closely resemble Article 2 of the Covenant Finally, clause (3) of Article
27 reads: "No one may be refused emergency medical treatment"
The appellantwas inthe final stages of an irreversible condition of renal
failure. Unable to afford private care, he sought dialysis treatment from a state
hospital, without which death was imminent. Because of limited equipment and
budget, the hospital could provide such treatment only to a limited number of
patients. Guidelines for admission to dialysis programs, drawn up by the
provincial administration responsible for health services, required that a patient
be eligible for a kidneytransplanttreatrnrentwould continue until an organ donor
was found. Because of his poor condition, appellant was not eligible for a
transplant Hence he would have required dialysis treatment for the rest of his
life. His application for an order directing the hospital to provide ongoing dialysis
treatment was dismissed by the lower court, and the Constitutional Court
affirmed.
In an opinion by its President Chaskalson, the Court quoted from the
preamble to the Constitution: the aspiration to a society based on "social justice
and fundamental human rights," the aspiration to "improve the quality of life of
all citizens." It observed that obligations imposed on the state with respect to
these social rights were dependent on available resources, and that in the
circumstances of South Afica, an "unqualified obligation" to meet health care.and
other needs "would not presently be capable of being fulfilled." "
The Court rejected the "broad construction" of clause (3) of Article 27
that emergency medical care included ongoing treatment of chronic illness. Such
a construction would make it "substantially more difficult" for the state to meet
its primary obligation under clauses (I) and (2) to provide health care services to
"everyone" within its available resources. It would reduce the resources available
to the state for purposes of preventative health care and treatment of curable
diseases. Indeed, the Court concluded that appellant's case did not fall within the
"emergency" criterion of clause (3), which the Court termed "a right not to be
refused emergency treatment"'2 Rather, appellant's case involved an ongoing
state of affairs, and was to be decided within the first two clauses of Article 27.
2 /d II.
,2 Id. 20.
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The Court noted thatthe budgetofthe provincial Department of Health
was overspent Resources were stretched in all renal clinics throughout the
state. Hence guidelines had to make the "agonizing choices" about who should
receive treatment
By usingthe available dialysis machines in accordance with the
guidelines more patients are benefited than would be the case
if they were used to keep alive persons with chronic renal
failure, and the outcome of the treatment is also likely to be
more beneficial because it is directed to curing patients.... It
has not been suggested that these guidelines are unreasonable
orthatthey were not applied fairly and rationally.... If all the
persons in South Africa who suffer from chronic renal failure
were to be provided with dialysis treatment... the cost of
doing so would make substantial inroads into the health
budget. And if this principle were to be applied to all patients
claiming access to expensive medical treatment or expensive
drugs, the health budget would have to be dramatically
increased to the prejudice of other needs which the state has
to meet' 3
In its argument, the Court blended (i) considerations of benefits and
costs and simple cost efficiency within a policy perspective, with (ii) attention to
its limited institutional competence to interfere with "rational decisions taken in
good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it
is to deal with such matters." 14 The state, it stressed, must umanage its limited
resources" in order to address the claims of the many people in need of access
to health care, housing and social security, all aspects of the right to human life.'5
In his concurring opinion, Justice Sachs observed that in open and
democratic societies, "the rationing of access to life-prolonging resources is
regarded as integral to, rather than incompatible with, a human rights approach
to health care."'6 It was necessary to adapt traditional rights analysis to account
for these problems governing a right of access to scarce resources.
3 Id. I 25,28.
'4 Id. 29.
S/d. 13 1.
16 /d 52.
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When rights by their very nature are shared and inter-
dependent, striking appropriate balances between the equally
valid entitlements or expectations of a multitude of claimants
should not be seen as imposing limits on those rights .... but
as defining the circumstances in which the rights may most
fairly and effectively be enjoyed.'7
As for intervention by courts in these matters, "institutional incapacity and
appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially cautious." 8
These opinions barely distinguish between the languages of rights and
cost-benefit. They underscore both the goal of social justice and the necessity
of management to achieve the effective use of resources. These are
understood, naturally presented, as complementary and interdependent rather
than antagonistic or even altemative discourses. Deciding on the full operational
definition of the right requires that "agonizing choices" be made, choices about
cost efficiency and vexingtrade-offs. These intertwined decisions are vital to the
very content and significance of the right: the type of health care system, the
funding, the priorities and coverage in terms of both persons and problems.
The problem of choice is seen at two levels: how to allocate funds and
arrange priorities within the health care system, and how to allocate funds among
the different social rights ranging from health care to housing. Indeed, at the
highest level of government the problem reaches more broadly to resource
allocation among all items on the government budget, as well as to the related
capacity to tax and borrow. The problem is truly systemic. Even when access
to health care is conceived of as an individual right rather than a policy goal, its
concrete realization cannot be determined independently of the system. When
alluding to the range of social rights in the Constitution, the Court highlights this
point by emphasizing the need for the state "to manage its limited resources in
order to address all these claims," a necessity which will at times require it to
"adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on
the specific needs of particular individuals within society.""'
To be sure, rights constitute a singularly powerful starting point, an
imperative for governmental consideration and action, a commitment at the
highest level to social justice and improvement of the quality of life. The fact that
7 /d. 54.
" /d. 58.
'9 /d. 3 1.
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rights and consequentialist argument may be interwoven does not imply that
they merge into each other, that they assume a common identity. To the
contrary, social rights serve here all the functions that rights discourse distinctively
serves: rights as a mobilizing force that speaks to basic aspects of human dignity,
appellant advancing a claim of right rather than asserting a want or interest, the
imposition on the state of constitutionally based duties rather than reliance on
fluctuating state policies that may be reversed.
The rights are also more than directive principles, for they impose an
immediate requirement on government to move toward progressive
achievement The language of Soobmrnoney indeed suggests one way of
understanding that requirement: to act rationally and in good faith to make the
rights operational. Depending on the precise issue, that requirement will
become to one or another degree justiable, appropriate for judicial review and
decision, as indeed it was in Soobrarnones decision to sustain the guidelines
andtieirapplication. Butthe satisfactory realization of this and many other social
rights will not stem from any process of derivation or necessary implication, from
any inner logic, from any search for the essential nature of the right or insulation
from other forms of reasoning.
The use of a judicial decision to illustrate these thoughts about social
rights poses a special problem that is noted in both the opinions described.
Institutional competence, the appropriate scope of judicial review of executive
or administrative or legislative action, distinguishes the considerations debated in
these opinions from the full range of considerations before these other branches
of government In the Sbobrmoneyopinion, the Court upheld the provision
and its application after concluding that the administrative decisions were
"rational" (presumably in terms both of the broad goal or end and its
responsiveness to the character of the right, and of the means-end reasoning to
achieve the result) and made in good faith. The essential conditions were met
My remarks do not suggest that all aspects of formulating or applying
social rights such as access to health care must involve such diverse
considerations and modes of argument. Much depends on the issue presented.
In other situations, identification ofthe content of a social right and judicial review
of its formulation or application may involve a "purer," less complex course of
argument that could indeed establish some baselines, some absolutes, some
non-consequentialist duties of government, some necessary implications of the
right that are immune to qualification by argument about resource constraints.
Surely this is so in the "easy' cases where governmental definition or application
of a right of access to health care violates other constitutional (and intemational
human) rights, such as those to due process in the application of the law, orto
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equal protection in the content of the law. In such circumstances, the critical
problem does not involve soca tight; as such, but rather a different rights
framework.
In other settings, the ongoing processes of expounding social rights have
generated authoritative rules or guidelines that establish baselines and place both
restraints and affimfrave duties on government. The content of the right moves
toward the "absolute" side of the spectrum, away from the contingent and
variable. Such absolute restraints and duties may, for example, address
governmental conductthat worsens an already deprived population's situation-
perhaps the destruction ofslums without provision of alternative housing-or that
establishes unjustified legal barriers to the realization of the right 2 At times such
duties may require fresh programs, such as school education about reproductive
health care. This ongoing and expanding identification of absolute rights of, say,
access to health care-without explicit, ongoing consideration of their costs and
benefits and of alternative dalms on funds-may rest not only on their
fundamental importance for health and social justice but also on an implicit
determination thatthey are now within the economic reach of all states that seek
in good faith to institute them.
I1. ECONOMICAND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
My remarks emphasize the World Bank, but start with a description of
the influential work of the UNDP. They do not reach to other UN instruments
(such as the Dedaration on the Right to Development), programs and
insttutins that yield a more complex and richer portrait of these matters.2 Nor
do they draw on the imaginative writings of economists and philosophers that
have exerted an important influence on these fields through innovative concepts
such as people's "basic capabilities."'
" See Gene CommentNo.3, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
10, U.N. Doc. E/i 99123, Annex 111, (1990); see also General Comment No. 4, supra
note 3, 110.
2 See generaflyJames Paul, The United Nations and the Creation ofan International
LawofDevelopment, 36 HAwV. INT. LJ. 307 (1995).
2' A prime illustration is the concept of "capability" as a vital goal and measure of
development. Growng primarily out of writings of Amartya Sen, that concept has
significantly influenced some basic ideas and indices in the annual Human Development
Reports of the UNDP, referred to below in the text. See generalyAmartya Sen,
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The work of the UNDP, particularlythe annual Human Development
Reports issued by it since 1990, has played an important role in changing
perceptions of development. The 1996 Report explores the links between
economic growth and human development and, like its predecessor reports,
seeks to correct the "mismeasure of human progress by economic growth
alone." 4 It advances a conception of a development program that must be
"people-centred, equitably distributed" and environmentally and socially
sustainable. Although economic growth and human development have no
automatic link, they can be mutually reinforcing. Far from being a mere
appendage to developnent theory, a humane afterthought, human development
must be made explicitly and integrally a part of it.
The Reports have developed a series of indices to measure human
development The basic measure is a "composite index of achievements in basic
human capabilities in three fundamental dimensions-a long and healthy life,
knowledge and a decent standard of living."' The three variables representing
these dimensions are life expectancy, educational attainment and income.26 The
measurements are disaggregated (unlike traditional statistical measures like per
capita income) to indicate how significantly human development differs with
respect to gender, race, religion, ethnic group, age and so on. What is at issue
is not simply the economic indicia of growth as measured by market prices of
production or incomes, but the quality of that growth.
Capabyft and We-Being, in THE QUALUTTY OF LIFE 30 0Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993); see aso Amartya Sen, De elopment Thinking at the Beginning of the X
Centuj, in ECONOMICAND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INTO THE XX CENTURY 531, 540-42
(Louis Emmerij ed., 1997). For analysis of and suggestions about the relationship
between rights-based approaches and capabilities, see generaly Martha Nussbaum,
CapaFes and Human Rh, 66 Fo RDHAM L REv. 273 (1997); see also Alicia By Yamin,
Refectow on Denning, Understanding, and Measuring Poert/ in Terms of Violadons of
EcanomicandSoc&ilghts under InteationalLaw, IV GEo.J. FIGHT. Pov. 273 (1997).
For other significant contributions to the policies of UNDP, seegeneralyMAHBUB UL
HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1995).
2 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996
(1996).
24 Id. at iii.
25 Id. at 28.
26 See idat 28-30.
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Human development is conceived in the large as a matter of enlarging
choices. The effort of the UNDP economists has been to reach beyond the
instrumental vision of people as "human capital" essential to growth, beyond
treating people and their improved education or health only as a means to
greater production, and in place of that vision to understand people as ends,
whose well being is the ultimate purpose of development. Hence the Human
Development Reports describe matters like health and education as valued in
themselves, as "essential components of human well-being."27
The Reports make frequent claims of causal links between the identified
"essential components of human well-being" and growth. Notions of the
instrumental and inherent value of such components of human well-being are
complexly interrelated. Educating women makes educated children more likely.
Indeed, "[t]he input with the greatest power is education," and [e]ducating girls,
worth doing for its own sake, also has important spin-off benefits. Educated
women are better able to ensure their children's survival and more likely to have
fewer children."' The Report refers to "[a] basic fact Healthy, well-educated
people make an economy more productive."29 Improving the nutrition, health
and education of workers leads to gains in worker productivity; particularly
primary education enhances such productivity. But these relationships are not
the only justifications for social investment in fields like food, health and
education, for "[t]he development of human capabilities is an end in itself."3°
In a revealing passage, the 1996 Report describes the right to adequate
housing as "[o]ne ofthe many development-related rights" that are stated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant By rati/ing the
Covenant, states
[H]ave firmly committed themselves to improving housing
conditions as part of their commitment to people-centred and
equitable development The key challenge is not for legal
experts to interpret legal texts, but for the policy-makers to
takethe necessary action to honour their commitment to the
people .... If international law can be one way of focusing
attention on the need for action, then so much the better.'
27 Id. at 54.
2' Id. at 74.
29 Id. at 75.
30 d
3' Id at 25.
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In otherwords, the Covenant and social rights in general can provide additional
support for the policy-maker advocating particular strategies toward
development. Ifinternational lawand the discourse of rights can be helpful, then
indeed "so much the better." Rights can be understood as "development-
related."
Nonetheless, while coming dose to notions of right-through a concept
oftreating people as ends, through a human development index employing the
idea of capabilities, through reference to "essential components of human well-
being"-the UNDP has not "internalized" the core conception of rights to the
point of directly using rights rhetoric in its advocacy. To some extent, it doubtless
shares the traditional scepticism of economists about the rhetoric of rights--a
scepticism surely traceable to the absolute, insistent, urgent quality of rights, to
their resistance to the concept of marginal utility and to trade-offs in a policy
framework.
The basic activity of the World Bank, created in 1946 at the Bretton
Woods Conference, involves long-term lending for productive investments, with
the current objective of raising developing countries' standard of living. The
radically different schools of thought generated over several decades in the field
of development economics eventually brought the Bank to changed perceptions
about the nature of and paths toward development32 In the process, the gap
between the Covenant and other instruments concerned with social rights, and
the Bank's programs has to some extent narrowed. An earlier near-exclusive
emphasis on macroeconomic phenomena-gross national product as measured
in market prices, neoclassical concern with less regulated markets, structural
adjustment programs enacting neoliberal theory-has given some ground to and
been complemented by more recent concern with the reduction of poverty and
conceptions of human development that bear some affinity to notions of rights.
Still, the policies described in the Bank's World Development Reports and
Annual Reports have moved far more guardedly than the UNDP in the direction
of employing rights-related notions.
Bythe 1989's, the Bank's references to human resource development
had become common.33 Such development, which included notions like
.See H.W. Singer, lsDetp nentEconomi=A5tRdeevant, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT INTO THE XXI CENTURY, supra note 22, at 507; see also Emmanuel de
Kadr, How Weldo EcovnisSere De~elopment Theoryand Pracice, in ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INTO THE)O( CENTURY, supra note 22, at 512; see also Sen,
Development Thinking at the Beginning of the XX0 Century, supra note 22, at 53 1.
3 SeegenerallyWoRLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1980 (1980).
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education and better health, was referred to as "an end as well as a means of
economic progress." 4 The causal relationships were dear. Human resources
benefiting from improved health and education could constitute a more effective
labor force producing greater growth. "Educating girls may be one of the best
investments a country can make in future economic growth and welfare... .""
The 1996 World Development Report expands on these earlier ideas.
Again there is stress on the role of social investment in fields like health and
education in spurring economic growth. "Education reform is urgent because the
erosion of a country's human capital imposes high downstream costs. Ill-
educated people make up a large proportion of the unemployed and the
poor."3 The argument, however, goes further. "Reform of the health care
system is needed to raise life expectancy and to reduce the burden of disease
and injury, contributing both to productivity and to the quality of life."39
The 1997 Annual Report?9 is more explicit. Reduction of poverty and
protection of the most vulnerable part of the population are described as an
overarching goal of the Bank through its loan policy.
Evidence continues to mount that investments in health,
nutrition, and education contribute to individual productivity
and, in the aggregate, to national economic growth. It is the
combination of good economics and the reduction of human
suffering that makes investments in human development a
powerful weapon in the fight against poverty.4"
The emphasis dearly remains on the instrumental efficacy of these social
investments to serve graphic and readily measurable purposes like heightened
production, butthe Report also makes a strong argument for bringing about the
social and political conditions that underlie effective development. It refers to a
task force within the Bank recognizing that "fair and equitable development
contributes to human welfare and to the social cohesion and social stability that
S/d. at 32.
5 Id. at 50.
36 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKEr (1996).
37 /d at 123.
38 id
3 WORD BANK, THE WORLD BANKANNUAL REPORT 1997.
40 Id. at 17.
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underpin sustainable development"'
Recent initiatives ofthe World Bank have made other ideals and norms
ofthe human rights instruments germane to its work. For the past decade, the
Bank has given extensive attention to the problem of "governance."42 The
concept is large and porous, but appears to include at its core notions related to
the rule of law (rule generality and reasonable predictability, separation of
powers assuring judicial independence), as well as to accountability, transparency,
and a minimum assurance of human rights that would tend to foster stability. The
discussion and prescription of good governance, while drawing on the human
rights corpus, absorbs its ideas into the Bank's own dominant framework. That
is, the basic civil and political rights that are drawn on are valued less for their
inherent or imperative quality than for their efficacy in creating those
circumstances in which economic development is most likely to occur. Other,
related work of the World Bank has stressed the importance of heightened
popular participation in the process of development
Relative to the UNDP and its absorption of components of human
development like heath or education into the core conception of development,
the World Bank has been less systematic, more wary of referring to inherent as
well as instrumental goods, and more consistently instrumental in its justifications
for the social investments discussed.
Ill. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What this comment proposes is more than an occasional, strategic
(some might say unholy) alliance between rights advocates and development
economists that could summon greater and more respectful attention to matters
like health, housing, and education. The proposal goes beyond a temporary
"marriage of convenience" between movements and institutions that in some
respects urge the same goals.
The idea is more basic. In a field like social rights (but not in all fields of
human rights), rights discourse at a certain point gives out. No program springs
full blown from the bare declaration of the right. It becomes essential to locate
social rights in the real world, in their historical, cultural and political context, in
4 /d. at 23.
42 See generaly LAWYwERS CoMMrl-EE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, THE WORLD BANK:
GOVERNANCEAND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1995).
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orderto work outthe content and forms of a health plan, a housing program, or
an educational system. Considerations of cost efficiencies and costs and benefits
become vital to designing the most effective way-for the while-to achieve the
right. All is up for reconsideration as contexts and possibilities change. There is
no one, final, unassailable form and content that the social right must take.
By the same token, the development economists will humanize their
undertaking bytaking account of the values underlyingthe rights framework, not
only in terms of their advantageous consequences for growth but also because
of their inherent importance. Whether the precise language of rights is
employed seems less significant Just as rights advocates may prove more
persuasive to many audiences by employing the language of costs and trade-offs
in the development of social programs and by stressing the utility of rights for
development, development economists could better reach audiences turned off
by raw economic calculations that ignore the needs, well-being and quality of life
of the very agents of development
Rights advocates might well fear that by venturing into the world of
consequentialism, they will surrender the most powerful attribute of rights
discourse: insistence on absolute and urgent rules based on notions of equal
human dignity and respect. The world of limitless trade-offs without fixed values
is more than uncongenial to a commitment to human rights; it is hostile and
threatening.43 In that world of trade-offs, there can be no constants. Indeed,
some day development economists might reject the evolving views described in
this comment about the significance of social rights for development
But my argument urges no abandonment of deep beliefs, no retreat
from rights' imperative quality. Rights remain the potent, insistent points of
departure. At that basic level, no compromise or trade-off can be in the cards,
and the two discourses remain profoundly different. Reshing out social rights in
the complex ways that have become characteristic of modem societies is a
different issue, a principal theme of this comment. Notions of right and fairness
continue to inform that process, but other considerations must as well. Room
now appears open fora fruiul use of both discourses to achieve goals that rights
43 Cf MA-THEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS (1995). The author notes the reluctance of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to allow problems of economic development to
justify lower support for economic and social rights. (Structural adjustment programs
offer an apt illustration.) "It seems to be the position of the majority of the Committee
that the process ofeconomic growth should be combined with the realization of human
rights. The idea that certain 'rade-offs' can be made is implicitly rejected." Id. at 139.
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advocates and many development economists are coming to hold in common.
My sugges6on is hat each group be supple enough to shed exclusive attachment
to a single method of argument and seize the day.
